Frank Hoffman’s review argues that the recent U.S. war against Iran exposed major failures in American statecraft and strategy. He defines sound statecraft as the integrated use of all national tools to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes, and says the Iran campaign revealed weak planning, poor risk assessment, and an overreliance on military power. Hoffman doubts U.S. officials will conduct an honest after-action review, since admitting failure would invite accountability, but he says the experience should still yield lessons—especially the need for better strategy formulation, clearer theories of success, and greater appreciation of adversary agency.
He emphasizes three core strategic problems. First, a strategy must have a coherent “theory of success” that links policy goals to feasible means and ways, rather than assuming military force alone can produce political outcomes. He criticizes the idea of a “theory of victory,” which can narrow strategy into a purely military framework. Second, strategists must think in terms of multiple futures. Scenario planning helps leaders challenge assumptions, anticipate shocks, and test whether strategies remain robust under different conditions. Third, strategy must rigorously assess risk, both risks created by the strategy and risks to the strategy itself, such as regional retaliation, disruption of shipping lanes, or interference by other powers.
The review then turns to Jack Watling’s book, *Statecraft: The New Rules of Power in a Divided World*, praising it as timely and important in a worsening global security environment. Watling’s experience studying Ukraine informs his analysis of modern warfare and the evolving tools of statecraft.
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